LibertySteward
Proof Voting Machines Can Be Rigged!
posted by Editor on 07-25-2003 16:12
Dramatic Proof that Voting Machines Can Be Rigged, The time of the hanging Chad has come - behold Professor Dill of Stanford University cites new evidence that Touch Screen Diebold Machines can be corrupted altering vote totals in any state that chooses to use them. Dr. Aviel Rubin, an associate of Professor Dill, has proved these machines can be rigged.
HR - 2239 is in Congress and needs your support. STOP VOTE FRAUD Recently an Arab Emirate bought stock in the company that produces these machines. Proof Voting Machines Can Be Rigged David L. Dill, the distinguished Professor of Computer Science and, by courtesy, Electrical Engineering at Stanford University, has just disclosed on his web site:
proof that voting machines of the touch screen genre, manufactured by Diebold can be rigged to produce false results or hacked to manipulate tallies of votes as they come into a precinct.
Professor Dill has been on the faculty of Stanford since 1987. He has an S.B. in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1979) and an M.S. and a PhD from Carnegie-Mellon University (1982-87). He is on the California Secretary of State's Ad Hoc Touch Screen Task Force and travels around the country speaking and education on the inherent dangers of current DRE (paperless direct recording electronic voting systems) and voting machines.
"We know", says Professor Dill, "that even a beginning programmer can write code that displays votes one way on a screen, records them another way, and tallies them yet another way. This can happen for a variety of reasons, including software and hardware errors, or "hacks" installed into the voting machines. These problems can occur even when voting machines have been thoroughly inspected and tested. DRE systems experienced a number of problems already in the 2002 elections, and we see this only as the tip of the iceberg. Since I entered the fray in January, I've been constantly challenged to "prove that DREs can be hacked." My answer was usually something like the following:
"It is very hard to find out enough details about these systems to determine what security flaws they have. However, we know it is practically impossible to stop tampering by insiders. Furthermore, any system that has not been designed and thoroughly scrutinized by top-flight computer security professionals is guaranteed to have major security holes."...
"It appears that it is easy to make counterfeit 'voter cards,' which can be used to vote as often as you like. One can easily make a fake 'administrator' card. Hackers could rearrange the candidate order on the ballot so that votes are credited to the wrong candidates."
"We've been told by voting machine vendors, regulators, and election officials that "hacking" DREs is almost impossible because the machines are designed carefully, use cryptography, and have proprietary software; that there are stringent Federal regulations; that Independent Testing Authorities (ITAs) scrutinize every line of code; that states have exhaustive certification processes; and localities do extensive Logic and Accuracy Tests."
It's just not true. That was obvious before the report, but now it should be undeniable....
Now I can "prove that the machines can be hacked" by citing the following paper which just appeared on the web. Computer security researchers at Johns Hopkins and Rice Universities have inspected the Diebold code that appeared on a web site in New Zealand a few weeks ago. The report appears at:
http://avirubin.com/vote.pdf is the actual page.
His associate Dr. Aviel Rubin's credentials are impressive and I encourage you to go to this site and read the report. Those of you with computer savvy please share any insights you have with us. It is a well written in depth report by an obviously brilliant mind in the field of Computer Science. Thank you Dr. Rubin!
Speaking objectively Professor Dill admits:
"There is no reason to believe that Diebold's system is less secure than other vendors. Their code just happened to be available. All the other vendors are implementing the same inadequate security requirements and satisfying the same inadequate reviews. There is also no reason to assume that the worst problems have been found. The authors felt that it was important to get the information out quickly. Additional weeks or months of review might reveal even worse problems."
If you want to do something very useful and patriotic Protect your Vote!
SUPPORT HR - 2239 AND CALL FOR IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION IN THE NEXT ELECTION.
HR 2239 -- The Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2003.
http://clerk.house.gov/floorsummary/floor.php
Professor Dill explains:
The paper trail bill introduced by Rep. Rush Holt now has 26 cosponsors, which is great! If one of your representatives is listed here, please take a moment to let them know you are pleased with their action. If your representative is NOT on the list, please contact him or her and asking them to do so -- and please send me an email (elections@chicory.stanford.edu) letting me know what their position is. "The paper trail bill introduced by Rep. Rush Holt now has 26 cosponsors, which is great! If one of your representatives is listed here, please take a moment to let them know you are pleased with their action.
If your representative is NOT on the list, please contact him or her and asking them to do so -- and please send me an email (elections@chicory.stanford.edu) letting me know what their position is."
List of Representatives supporting HR - 2239 is as follows: &
Rep Baird, Brian - 6/17/2003 [WA-3]
Rep Brown, Corrine - 7/9/2003 [FL-3]
Rep Brown, Sherrod - 6/24/2003 [OH-13]
Rep Case, Ed - 7/21/2003 [HI-2]
Rep Conyers, John, Jr. - 6/17/2003 [MI-14]
Rep Davis, Danny K. - 7/21/2003 [IL-7]
Rep Eshoo, Anna G. - 6/24/2003 [CA-14]
Rep Farr, Sam - 7/21/2003 [CA-17]
Rep Fattah, Chaka - 7/21/2003 [PA-2]
Rep Filner, Bob - 7/9/2003 [CA-51]
Rep Frank, Barney - 6/24/2003 [MA-4]
Rep Hinchey, Maurice D. - 6/17/2003 [NY-22]
Rep Hoeffel, Joseph M. - 6/24/2003 [PA-13]
Rep Jones, Stephanie Tubbs - 7/21/2003 [OH-11]
Rep Kaptur, Marcy - 6/17/2003 [OH-9]
Rep Lantos, Tom - 7/9/2003 [CA-12]
Rep Lee, Barbara - 6/17/2003 [CA-9]
Rep Owens, Major R. - 6/24/2003 [NY-11]
Rep Rothman, Steve R. - 7/9/2003 [NJ-9]
Rep Schakowsky, Janice D. - 6/24/2003 [IL-9]
Rep Scott, Robert C. - 6/24/2003 [VA-3]
Rep Strickland, Ted - 6/24/2003 [OH-6]
Rep Van Hollen, Chris - 6/17/2003 [MD-8]
Rep Wexler, Robert - 6/17/2003 [FL-19]
Rep Woolsey, Lynn C. - 6/17/2003 [CA-6]
Rep Wynn, Albert Russell - 7/21/2003 [MD-4]
As a political candidate running for Congress in the 2nd CD of New Mexico and and as a Green Party write-in I had and continue to have many concerns about the potential for voting fraud. I found the following two anecdotes from Professor Dill's newsletter quite interesting:
"DIESEL ENGINES A few years ago, I read in the newspaper that diesel engine manufacturers had to pay a huge fine for lying about the pollution generated by their engines. It turns out that the details of the story are interesting, and relevant to voting machines (surprisingly).
The engines are computer-controlled, and the computers were programmed to produce low emissions, at lower efficiency, under test conditions. However, the computer control could sense when the engines were NOT being tested and increase efficiency at the cost of higher emissions on the open road.
I've heard of similar fraud with gasoline pumps. The weights and measures people would test the pumps by pumping exactly a gallon of gasoline. So, the computer-controlled pumps would measure the first gallon exactly and a little less for subsequent gallons. (Sorry, I have no reference. Maybe someone can send me one.)"
Thank You Professor Dill for your fine efforts on behalf of the common citizen and the democratically motivated voter. Libertysteward.com will continue to assist you in this non-partisan endeavor.
We therefore call the readers attention to the fact that Professor Dill's group of concerned advocates of verifiable auditable voting will be holding a meeting which will be a USACM SPONSORED VOTER VERIFIED ELECTION SYSTEMS WORKSHOP
USACM sponsored Workshop on Voter-Verifiable Election Systems July 2829, 2003, Denver Colorado Adams Mark Hotel
This will be an informal workshop to discuss voter verifiable election systems: Security issues in DREs, possible solutions, and related topics. Quite a few interesting people have registered, including people with many different viewpoints.
There will be a session Monday afternoon 1 PM - 5 PM and another session Tuesday morning 9 AM - Noon.
We would like people to register online, so we know who is coming and how many will be coming. The workshop is free and open to the public. We have room for 75 people.
The original workshop announcement and registration form are available at:
We don't have any money available for travel reimbursement, and we don't have a conference with the Adams Mark (although you should definitely find out about AAA rates). There are other hotels nearby that may have good rates.
CLARIFICATION: The workshop has no organizational connection with the IACREOT conference. We have scheduled it near IACREOT for the convenience of people attending IACREOT.
